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SECURED TRANSACTIONS: Financing Statement Signature
Requirements-In re Save-On-Carpets of Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d
1239 (9th Cir. 1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two key terms pervade the law of chattel security: attach3
ment' and perfection.' The attachment of a security interest between the secured party and the debtor must be perfected if the
secured party is to be protected against third parties.' There are
three ways in which a security interest may be perfected under
5
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The perfection of a
security interest may be accomplished through filing a financing
7
statement,' possession of the collateral by the secured party, or, in
some cases, merely by attachment.' Most security interests may be
perfected either by filing or possession depending on the type of
collateral involved.
When a security interest is perfected by filing notice, the docu0
ment placed on record is referred to as a financing statement.
i
Filing a financing statement under Article 9 " is the more common
and perhaps the most important method of perfecting a security
interest.' 2 The filing requirements set forth in section 9-402(1) of the
1. Attachment is a technical term indicating the creation of a security interest between
the secured party and the debtor. The official comment to § 9-203 of the Code sets out the
basic prerequisites for the attachment of an enforceable security interest through the execution of a security agreement. The basic prerequisites to an enforceable nonpossessory security
interest in cases not involving land include: "(a) a writing; (b) the debtor's signature; and
(c) a description of the collateral or kinds of collateral." U.C.C. § 9-203, Comment 3. All
citations are to the 1962 version of the Code and official comments unless otherwise noted.
2. See L. DENONN, SECURITY TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE ORIGINAL AND THE REVISED U.C.C.
38-39 (6th ed. 1974).
3. A security interest is "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
4. The judgment creditor, trustee in bankruptcy, and subsequent secured parties are
three common examples of third party claimants.
5. L. DENONN, supra at 38.
6. U.C.C. § 9-402.
7. U.C.C. § 9-305.
8. U.C.C. § 9-302.
9. 2 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 605
(1964). "The first step in perfecting a security interest is to characterize the collateral so as
to determine which options, if any, exist." Id.

10.

U.C.C. § 9-402(4). G.

(1965).
11.

GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY

346

U.C.C. § 9-402.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-5, at 796 (1972). See note
53 and accompanying text infra.

12.
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Code are to a large extent technical and often escape critical notice
as simply matters of accessory detail.13 Such issues of technical
formality are frequently the essence of chattel security law, however, and they are ignored at one's peril. 4
Under the 1972 revision of Article 9 of the Code," the financing
statement must include: the names of the debtor and secured
party, the signature of the debtor, the address of the secured party,
and a description of the items of collateral." Prior to the 1972 revision, the signature of the secured party was also required, 7 although
there is no clear reason why.' One of the principal draftsmen of
Article 9, Grant Gilmore, admits that there is no substantial reason
why the creditor must sign. 9 The 1972 revision of Article 9 adopted
this view, requiring the signature of only the debtor for both the
security agreement and the financing statement.
In re Save-On-Carpets of Arizona, Inc.10 is a recent decision
focusing on the issue of what constitutes a "signing" under section
9-402(1) of the Code as adopted by Arizona. 2 1 The controversy over
what constitutes a "signing" under section 9-402(1) has given rise
13. Ayer, New Article 9 and the California Commercial Code, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
937, 981 (1974).

14.

Id.

15. The revision of Article 9 is the result of several years' work by the Article 9
Review Committee and the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code. The study that produced the revised version of Article 9 was initiated by the
Permanent Editorial Board after consideration of a report showing that more than 300
non-uniform, non-official amendments had been made to various sections of Article 9
in the adopting jurisdictions. The Board regarded this as a "distressing situation." The
Board also took note of suggestions in articles and textbooks for improvements in
Article 9. A "restudy in depth of Article 9" was recommended, and the Article 9 Review
Committee was appointed to undertake it.
Two Preliminary Drafts prepared by the Review Committee in 1968 and 1970 were
discussed at meetings of the American Law Institute, at meetings of interested sections
of the American Bar Association, and at other sessions. The final draft was approved
in 1971 and has been published as "1972 Official Text and Comments of Article
9-Secured Transactions." In addition to the revision of Article 9, minor amendments
were also made in 1-105, 1-201(9) and (37), 2-107 and 5-116.
UCC RFp. SERV. (Art. 9 Introductory Note, 1972 version). See notes 27 & 54 infra.
16. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972 version).
17. The requirement that the secured party sign the financing statement under § 9402(1) was confusingly in conflict with § 9-203(1) requiring only the signature of the debtor
appear on the security agreement. See Gilmore, supra note 10 at 346.
18. "Commentators unanimously maintain that the creditor's signature is an unnecessary technicality, adds nothing to the veracity of the statement,and is unlikely to assist the
researcher in uncovering information." White & Summers, supra note 12, at 835-36.
19. Gilmore, supra note 10 at 347.
20. 545 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1976).
21. Aiuz. Rav. STAT. § 44-3141 (Supp. 1976-77).
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to a substantial amount of litigation deserving extended attention.
The decision reached and the rationale applied by the Ninth Circuit
in Save-On-Carpetswill be analyzed in light of the principles and
underlying policies of the Code and the development of the case law
on point.
II.

FACTS

Trend Mills, the creditor appellant, attempted to perfect a
valid security interest in the property of Save-On-Carpets of Arizona, Inc. 22 The interest of the appellant was evidenced by a financState.2 1
ing statement which was filed with the Arizona Secretary of
On March 6, 1974, 2 Save-On-Carpets of Arizona, the debtor, was
adjudged bankrupt.
On March 19, 1974, the trustee for the bankrupt debtor filed a
complaint and petition for authority to sell certain assets free of
liens. 25 Three creditors appeared in the proceedings and asserted
secured claims. It was during these proceedings that the perfection
2
of the security interest of Trend Mills was initially challenged. The
perfection of the security interest was attacked on the ground that
in the space provided for the signature of the secured party, there
appeared no hand written name but only the typed name of the
agent for Trend Mills.27
The bankruptcy court entered its judgment on April 18, 1975,
allowing two of the creditors' claims as secured while rejecting the
contention of Trend Mills that it had a perfected security interest
2
in the property of Save-On-Carpets of Arizona, Inc. 8 The bank22. "In the original petition, the debtor listed Trend Mills as a creditor holding security
with the collateral being inventory and stock in trade." Brief for Appellant at 2, In re SaveOn-Carpets of Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing the Record at 14).
23. The financing statement was filed with the Arizona Secretary of State on December
28, 1972. Brief for Appellant at 13, Id.
24. Brief for Appellee at 3, Id. (citing the Record at 35).
25. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Id. (citing the Record at 36-37).
26. No issue was taken with the place of filing, as the financing statement was duly filed
with the Arizona Secretary of State. Brief for Appellant at 13, Id.
27. It is interesting to note that Arizona has amended its Code, effective January 1,
1976, to conform with the 1972 revision of § 9-402(1), requiring only the signature of the debtor
on the financing statement. Armz. REv. STAT. §1 44-3141(A)(Supp. 1976-77). The law in
Arizona at the time the controversy arose and was heard, however, required that the signatures of both the creditor and the debtor appear on the financing statement. Nonetheless,
the controversy over what constitutes a valid signature within the construction of § 9-402
remains. The 1972 revision of Article 9 has not yet been adopted by a majority of the states.
Furthermore, the issue is a current one with respect to what constitutes a valid signature by
the debtor.
28. Brief for Appellant at 6, In re Save-On-Carpets of Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d 1239 (9th
Cir. 1976) (citing the Record at 75).
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ruptcy court ruled that Trend Mills had only an unsecured claim
because of its failure to comply with section 44-3141 of the Arizona
Code.2 9 This conclusion was reached largely upon the finding by the
bankruptcy judge that "the security agreement asserted by Trend
Mills in support of its secured claim was acknowledged not to be
signed by the secured creditor, Trend Mills."30
The United States District Court for the district of Arizona
denied the motion for rehearing made by Trend Mills and, affirming
the bankruptcy court, held that the creditor appellant did not have
a perfected security interest in the assets of the bankrupt 3 ' under
Article 9 of the Code as adopted by Arizona. 2 Trend Mills then
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
III. DECISION
The Ninth Circuit found that the sole issue on appeal was
"whether the district court erred in holding that the financing
statement was not 'signed' as required by the Arizona statute."33
The examination of the record by the court of appeals resulted
in a finding contrary to that of the bankruptcy court and district
court. The crucial finding by the bankruptcy court, accepted by the
district court, was that Trend Mills acknowledged it had not signed
the financing statement.34 Not only did the court of appeals determine that Trend Mills made no such acknowledgement, the court
also found that the position of Trend Mills had "always been to the
contrary. ' 35 Thus, the court determined the finding made by the
bankruptcy court was clearly erroneous.
The court went on to hold that the typewritten name of the
29. "A. A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured
party, designated by typing or printing the names and addresses of both the debtor and the
secured party and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of
collateral." Asuz. Rzv. STAT. § 44-3141(A) (1967) (emphasis added).
Section 402 of the Code's 1972 revision specifies that only the address of the secured party
appear on the financing statement. See note 16 and accompanying text supra. The only
apparent reason for the Arizona Code's additional requirement that the debtor's address also
appear on the financing statement is to provide an additional source from which information
concerning the security interest may be obtained.
30. Brief for Appellant at 5, In re Save-On-Carpets of Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d 1239 (9th
Cir. 1976) (citing the Record at 72-74).
31. Id. at 7 (citing the Record at 139).
32. ARtZ. Rav. STAT. § 44-3101-53 (1967 & Supp. 1976-77).
33. 545 F. 2d at 1240.
34. Id.
35. Id. "It's our position that there, in fact, is a signature, a typewritten signature on
the financing statement." Id. at 1240 n.4.
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agent for Trend Mills was within the construction of the Arizona
Code, defining "signed" as "includ[ing] any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing."'3 The court also noted the official comment to section 44-

2208(39) recognizes that "no catalog of possible authentications can
be complete and the court must use common sense and commercial
experience in passing upon these matters.

' 37

Accordingly, the court

found that the intent of Trend Mills to authenticate the financing
statement was "objectively manifested by the direction that its corporate name and its credit manager's name be typed in the appropriate spaces, and by the submission of the financing statement to
the Arizona Secretary of State for filing. ' 3 Under Article 9 as
adopted by Arizona, the Ninth Circuit took the position that a
''person or corporation" may effectively "sign a financing statement
by a typewritten signature.

'3

A tripartite rationale was utilized to buttress the decision
reached in Save-On-Carpets.First, the court theorized that the Arizona Supreme Court would clearly have reached the same conclusion.40 Second, the court cited section 44-2202 of the Arizona Code,
providing that "the Code shall be liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies.

' 41

Finally, the

court reasoned that the financing statement as filed by Trend Mills
"could in no way have misled potential creditors of the debtor or in
any other way have detracted from the principles and policies of the
Code.""
36. ARz. REv. STAT. § 44-2208(39) (1967 & Supp. 1976-77). U.C.C. § 1-201(39).
37. U.C.C. § 1-201, Comment 39.
38. 545 F.2d at 1240. "Any other interpretation would be contrary to commercial experience and our knowledge of business practices." Id.
39. Id. at 1241.
40. The court cited three cases in support of its contention that the Arizona Supreme

Court would have reached the same conclusion. Maricopa County v. Osborn, 60 Ariz. 290,
136 P.2d 270 (1943); Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Sports Shack,
383 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
41. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 44-2202(A). U.C.C. § 1-102(1); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 44-2202(B) and
the U.C.C. § 1-102(2) enumerate those purposes and policies as:
1. To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.
2. To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties.
3. To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
42. 545 F.2d at 1241. See AIz. REv. STAT. § 44-3141(E) (1967). U.C.C. § 9-402(5).
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ANALYSIS

A. Congruence with the Principles and Underlying Policies of the
Code
The Ninth Circuit's determination in Save-On-Carpets that
the typewritten name of Trend Mills conformed to the Code's financing statement signature requirements rests largely upon the
court's reliance on the text and official comments to section 1-201
of the Code.43 In the official comment to that section, specific reference is made to the Code's recognition that "no catalog of possible
authentications can be complete" and that the "question is always
whether the symbol was executed or adopted by the party with
present intention to authenticate the writing."" This approach to
the issues surrounding Article 9 signature requirements is consistent
with the Code's statement of "purposes and policies."45 An examination of a particular symbol adopted by a party attempting to
execute a valid signature based on a "present intention to authenticate" criterion is perhaps the most direct way to foster "the continued expansion of business practices through custom, usage, and
agreement," while striving for modernization and uniformity
"among the various jurisdictions.""
The 300 non-uniform and non-official amendments to the various sections of Article 9 were the primary catalyzing forces which
led to the 1972 revision.4 7 With respect to compliance with the
Code's signature requirements, the "present intention to authenti43. "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Amz. REV. STAT. § 44-2208(39) (1967). U.C.C. §.1-201(39).
The inclusion of authentication in the definition of "signed" is to make clear that as
the term is used in this Act a complete signature is not necessary. Authentication may
be printed, stamped, or written; it may be by initials or by thumbprint. It may be on
any part of the document and in appropriate cases may be found in a billhead or
letterhead. No catalog of possible authentications can be complete and the Court must
use common sense and commercial experience in passing upon these matters. The
question always is whether the symbol was executed or adopted by the party with
present intention to authenticate the writing.
U.C.C. § 1-201, Comment 39.
44. Since the security interest and financing statement guidelines provided for in §§ 9203 and 9-402 of the Code both list § 1-201 as a definitional cross reference for the term
"signed," the same argument can also be made that the "present intention
to authenticate"
approach is applicable to the security agreement signature requirement contained in § 9203(1)(b).
45. See note 41 supra.
46. Id.
47. See note 15 supra.
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cate"8 approach is one way to mitigate this "distressing situation""
and instill some degree of certainty and uniformity among the various adopting jurisdictions. An approach focusing on the intent of a
party to authenticate, as opposed to a fanatical preoccupation with
0
specific modes of effectuating a signature, is one which more adequately accommodates and promotes the "continued expansion of
commercial practices." 5 '
The "present intention to authenticate" approach, spelled out
by the Code and applied in the Save-On-Carpets decision, is also
consonant with the system of "notice filing" as adopted by the
Code's financing statement provisions." Notice filing is said to serve
a dual purpose. Filing a financing statement affords protection to
third parties. who might be misguided had they not known of the
security interest. It also provides a method for the secured party to
perfect a security interest which is more convenient to both the
than placing the collateral in possessecured party and the debtor
3
party.
secured
sion of the
Filing a financing statement to perfect a security interest
"indicates merely that the secured party who has filed may have a
4
[valid] security interest in the collateral described." The actual
48. See note 43 supra.
49. See note 15 supra.
50. See U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 5: "[The policy of this Article [is] to simplify
formal requisites and filing requirements and is designed to discourage the fanatical and
impossibly refined reading of such statutory requirements in which courts have occasionally
indulged themselves." Id. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text infra.
51. See note 41 supra.
52. Section 9-402 of the Code "adopts the system of 'notice filing.' " U.C.C. § 9-402,
Comment 2. Further reference is made to the Code's adoption of "notice filing" in § 9312(5)(a). In the case of conflicting security interests in the same collateral, priority is determined on the basis of "the order of filing if both are perfected by filing, regardless of which
security interest attached first under Section 9-204(1) and whether it attached before or after
filing." U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
53. Haydock, Certainty and Convenience--CriteriaFor The Place Of Filing Under
The Uniform Commercial Code, 3 B.C. INDUS. L. Rav. 179 (1961-62).
54. U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 2. "Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be
necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs." Id.
There are many instances under the Code where a security agreement may double as a
financing statement. "A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing statement
if it contains the'above information and is signed by the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-402(1). This
was one of the primary reasons why the 1972 version of Article 9 dropped the requirement
that the secured party also sign the financing statement to conform with the security agreement provision that only the debtor must sign.
Subsection (1) has been changed to require only the signature of the debtor rather
than that of the secured party. The requirement of signatures of secured parties has
sometimes misled secured parties, who are accustomed to pre-Code practice and real
estate practice under which only the debtor, not the secured party, need sign such
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attachment of an enforceable security interest turns on the issue
whether the interested parties have complied with the prerequisites
set out in the Code for the execution of a security agreement.5 5 Given
the attachment of an enforceable security interest, the financing
statement provides the filer with a method convenient to both the
secured party and the debtor to perfect the security interest. Furthermore, "notice filing" provides the third party searcher with a
vehicle to protect himself from being misled about the extent to
which a potential debtor's collateral may already be encumbered.
The synergistic effect of the liberal construction of "signed"5 6
and the dual purpose of "notice filing"57 supports the decision rendered in Save-On-Carpetsthat the typed name of a corporation or
person appearing on a financing statement may constitute a valid
signature within the construction of the Code. The threshold determinant then becomes whether the party attempting to effectuate a
signing has demonstrated the "present intention to authenticate.""
A typed name is certainly within the scope of "possible authentications"5 9 and it is hard to conceive of any manner in which it would
detract from the dual purpose of "notice filing." So long as the
correct names of the secured party and the debtor, the address of
the secured party,6 ° and a description of the collateral involved appear on the financing statement, the symbol adopted to effectuate
a signature will be of no consequence to the ability of a third party
searcher to locate the information he seeks. Furthermore, the
''present intention to authenticate" approach places the financing
statement signature requirement in congruence with the particular
commercial practices of both the debtor and secured party.6 Thus,
the convenience of notice filing is enhanced and the underlying
purposes and policies of the Code are promoted.
instruments as chattel mortgages and real estate mortgages. Thus, when the security
agreement was used as the financing statement, it might have been defective under
the 1962 Code for failure to have the signature of the secured party.
U.C.C. § 9-402 (Appendix) (Reasons for 1972 Change).
55. U.C.C. § 9-203. See note 1 supra.
56. See note 43 supra.
57. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
59. U.C.C. § 1-201, Comment 39. See note 43 supra.
60. The Arizona Code requires that the address of the debtor also appear on the financing statement. See note 29 supra.
61. The signature of the secured party is still required in those jurisdictions that have
not yet adopted the 1972 revision of Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
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PrecedentialSupport and Countervailing Case Law

Save-On-Carpets draws precedential support from the three
cases cited in that opinion and other case law on point.6" In
Maricopa County v. Osborn 3 the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that a "signature may be written by hand, or printed, or stamped,
or cut from one inor typewritten, or engraved, or photographed,
6' 4
strument and attached to another.
Benedict v. Lebowitz 5 is a Second Circuit case on point with
the issues presented in Save-On-Carpets. In Benedict the creditor
prepared a financing statement and attempted to sign the instrument by typing his name in the appropriate box. As in Save-OnCarpets, the Benedict court construed sections 1-201(39) and 9-402
as permitting a typewritten signature to effectuate a vaid signing
where there is demonstrated an "intention to authenticate the writing." 6 Again, as in Save-On-Carpets,the Benedict court interpreted
the direction by the creditor that his name appear on the financing
statement and his subsequent act of filing the statement as clearly
establishing the intent to authenticate that document. Another
similarity is that both the Save-On-Carpets and Benedict decisions
applied the "seriously misleading" standard in deciding the issue of
compliance with the financing statement signature requirement. 8
62. In addition to the three cases cited by the court in support of its decision, there
exists other case law on point and consistent with its interpretation of "signed." Joseph
Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117 (D.C. Cal. 1948) (a pre-Code case holding the
term signature includes any mark or sign written or placed on a document with the intent to
execute or authenticate a writing); In re State Discount Furniture Co., Inc., 2 UCC REP. SERv.
20 (Ref. Dec. D. Conn. 1964) (debtor's name printed on a financing statement constitutes a
signing); In re Horvath, 1 UCC REP. SERV. 624 (Ref. Dec. D. Conn. 1963) (typed name of
creditor corporation on a financing statement constitutes a sufficient signing).
In Alloway v. Stuart, 385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1964), the court went as far as to effectively
read the signature requirement out of the Code's financing statement provisions.
In [Alloway], the Kentucky court finds its standard of substantiality in the statutory
purpose of providing notice; since the absence of a secured party's signature would
almost never deprive any would-be creditor of notice where the name otherwise appears on the financing statement, the court has effectively read the signature requirement out of the statute-at least for the purpose of judicially determining the sufficiency of a financing statement. (footnote omitted).
65 COLUM. L. REv. 922, 923 (1965).
63. 60 Ariz. 290, 136 P.2d 270 (1943). The issue of what constitutes an effective signing
arose in the context of the redemption of county highway bonds.
64. Id. at 292, 136 P.2d at 274.
65. 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965).
66. Id. at 122.
67. Id.
68. "A financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading."
U.C.C. § 9-402(5). See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
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Notwithstanding the validity of an attempt to execute an effective
signature, section 9-402(5) of the Code provides that an imperfect
signing may adequately satisfy the financing statement signature
requirement if the imperfection is a minor error which is not seriously misleading." The Benedict court found that the typed signature of the secured party was not seriously misleading and did not
render the financing statement ineffective.7o
In re Sports Shack7 ' is a more recent district court decision
forwarding a similar construction of the financing statement signature requirements on the basis of section 1-201(39) of the Code, its
purposes and policies, and the "seriously misleading" standard. The
Sports Shack court held that a handwritten inscription "sufficiently
indicates the necessary intent" on the part of the secured party to
comply with signature requirements of a financing statement.72 The
court went on to find that there was nothing inconsistent with the
purposes and policies of the Code,7 3 nor seriously misleading" about
a handwritten inscription executed as a signature.
Notwithstanding this precedential support, there exists countervailing case law militating against the decision reached by the
court in Save-On-Carpets.7"
The deterrent effect on the party actually signing impressed the
Court in In re Carlstrom. e
Signatures are a simple and reliable means of linking the signatories
to fraud or of exposing them to liability for failure to comply with
statutory and contractual duties or for damages caused by inaccurate
or "greedy" filing. Because of the probative value of signatures there
is some deterrent effect inherent in any requirement that signatures
69.
70.

Id. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
346 F.2d 120, 122.

71. 383 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
72. Id. at 39.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 41.
75. Little v. County of Orange, 31 N.C. App. 495, 229 S.E.2d 823 (1976), is a recent
decision which has been reported to stand for the proposition that the typed name of a
corporation on a financing statement is insufficient to serve as a signature. More accurately,
the Little decision turned on the fact that the security instrument was not signed by "any
corporate officer in his official capacity." Id. at 498, 229 S.E.2d 825.
It is apparent that the Little court found merit in the appellee's contention that "[wihile
a typed name may arguably be sufficient to give notice to interested persons of the name of
the secured party, it should not be sufficient to create the security interest and encumber
the debtor's property when the debtor has nowhere else signed the security agreement." Brief
for Appellee at 8, Little v. County of Orange, 31 N.C. App. 495, 229 S.E.2d 823 (1976). The
court did not refer to the Code's § 1-201(39) signature guidelines.
76. 3 UCC REP. Saav. 766 (Ref. Dec. D. Me. 1966).
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be affixed on documents available for public inspection as a prerequisite to validity. It follows as a matter of course that where the
probative value of a signature is lacking so also is its deterrent effect."
Since the space provided on the statement for the signature of the
secured party was left blank, In re Carlstrom is distinguishable from

Save- On-Carpets."
The court in In re Carlstrom went on, however, to find section
1-201(39) inconsistent with the context of section 9-402 of the
Code:
A construction more consonant with the context, language and rationale of § 9-402 is that the financing statement must bear a symbol
affixed by the secured party or its authorized representative which is
susceptible of evidentiary connection to the signatory. Insofar as § 1201(39) serves to elevate "any symbol" to the status of a sufficient
signature without regard to its evidentiary value it must be held to
be inconsistent with the context of § 9-402 and hence inapplicable."
This interpretation is somewhat of an anomaly since the official
comment to section 1-201(39) does recognize that the crucial question "is whether the symbol was executed or adopted with present
intention to authenticate the writing."" Furthermore, if it is determined that a party has indeed "executed or adopted" a particular
symbol "with present intention to authenticate," then it is at least
arguable that the "deterrent effect" of a signature was operative at
the time of the actual signing. Nonetheless, this position was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Maine in Maine League Federal

Credit Union v. Atlantic Motors."

2 went one step further and construed the signature
In re Kane"
provision of section 9-402 of the Code as necessitating the extraordinary requirement of a "signature manually produced by a writing
instrument. "83
77. Id. at 771.
78. Trend Mills, the secured creditor in Save-On-Carpets,attempted to sign the financing statement by directing that its name be typed in the appropriate space.
In re Glass, 4 Secured Transactions Guide 52,700 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 1975), is a more
recent case supporting the decision reached in Carlstrom. Glass similarly held that the
creditor had only an unsecured claim as the space provided on the statement for the signature
of the secured party was left blank. Thus, it is also distinguishable from Save-On-Carpets.
79. 3 UCC REP. SERv. 766, 772-73.
80. See note 43 supra.
81. 250 A.2d 497 (Me. 1969).
82. 1 UCC REP. Smav. 582 (Ref. Dec. E.D. Pa. 1962).
83. Id. at 586-87.
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Signatures in the modern world of commerce appear in many
forms. There are stampings of signature facsimiles, printed facsimiles, photo-facsimiles, and other chemical and mechanical reproductions, to mention a few. As I construe the Code however, the provision
"signed by the debtor and secured party" appearing in Section 9-402
of the Code means an actual signature manually produced by a writing instrument in the hand of the signer in direct contact with the
document being executed."
Such extraordinary interpretations of section 9-402, as the ones
rendered in In re Carlstrom and In re Kane, stand in total disregard
for the signature guidelines provided in section 1-201,15 the
"seriously misleading" standard found in section 9-402(8),s8 and
the
underlying purposes and polices of the Code.87
V.

CONCLUSION

The extraordinary requirements set by In re Carlstrom and In
re Kane manifest a judicial imposition of a "fanatical" construction
of the Code which the drafters labored to purge. 8 Alloway v. Stuart
exemplifies the other extreme of the spectrum of possible constructions given the signature requirement of section 9-402. A judicial
determination, as the one reached in Alloway, effectively reading
the signature requirement out of the financing statement provisions,
is equally as "fanatical" as the decisions rendered by the In re
Carlstrom and In re Kane courts.
Hopefully, future decisions in chattel security law will pursue
the enlightened views of the Second Circuit in Benedict and the
Ninth Circuit in Save-On-Carpets, where it was held that a typewritten name of a corporation constitutes a valid signature under
Article 9 of the Code. Consideration of "the nature of any alleged
defect, its impact upon others and the intention of both debtor and
the secured party"' comports with the underlying purposes and
policies of the Code, the text and official comments of both the
signature guidelines provided in section 1-201(39) and the "seriously
misleading" standard outlined in section 9-402(8), and the Code's
84. Id.
85. See note 43 supra.
86. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 41, 45 and accompanying text supra.
88. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8), Comment 9; White & Summers, supra note 12, at 837.
89. See note 62 supra.
90. Brief for Appellant at 20, In re Save-On-Carpets of Arizona In'c., 545 F.2d 1239 (9th
Cir. 1976) (citing Calloway v. Admiral Credit Corp., 407 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1969)).
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system of "notice filing." Save-On-Carpets delivers the enlightened
view of chattel security law to the Ninth Circuit.
Garry W. O'Donnell
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